In the existing network covert channel research, the transmission of secret messages is one-way, lacking confirmation feedback on whether the secret message is successfully accepted. However, voice over LTE (VoLTE) has real-time interactive features, and the data packets between the sender and the receiver are transmitted in both directions, which facilitates the construction of a two-way covert channel with feedback. Therefore, we propose a two-way VoLTE covert channel adaptive to mobile network environment, which includes a sender-to-receiver covert timing channel that modulates covert message through actively dropping packets during the silence periods and a reverse covert storage channel that hides the acceptance of the covert message as feedback information into the feedback control information field of the real-time transport control protocol (RTCP) packet. The sender evaluates the current attack severity according to the feedback and adjusts the real-time parameters of the covert timing channel to weigh the robustness and other performance, thereby constructing a two-way covert channel adaptive to complex mobile network environments. Experimental results show that this solution can maintain voice quality which is an important performance indicator for VoLTE, while keeping the covert channel undetectable and robust.
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of covert channels was first proposed by Lampson [1] , who saw covert communication as a process of communicating data through a transmission channel that is neither designed nor expected. The emergence of information theory, coding theory, and high-performance systems interconnected by high-speed networks has led to the development of covert channels, especially covert timing channels, from conceptual ideas to potential practical tools. The network covert channels that use the network communication medium to transmit information in a covert manner have become the focus of covert channel research. With the security threat of privacy in new environments such as mobile networks and cloud computing [2] - [5] , covert channels have attracted more attention.
Covert channels are generally classified into two types: covert storage channels (CSCs) and covert timing channels (CTCs) [6] . The storage covert channel means that the sender directly or indirectly writes information to certain storage
The associate editor coordinating the review of this article and approving it for publication was Xiaojiang Du. locations (memory unit, resource status, network data packet, etc. [7] - [10] ), and the receiver restores the information from the sender by observing the storage location. The covert timing channel means that the influence of the sender on system events (performance, behavior, etc. [11] - [17] ) can be observed by the receiver, and the two parties use the sequence of events, interval, frequency and other time factors to transmit covert message. Covert channels have both legitimate and malicious applications. An example of a malicious use of a covert channel is that criminals use it to leak the secret information of a business. An example of a legitimate application is that a network administrator can use covert channels to hide communications related to network management or to transmit authentication data. Zander et al. [18] and Archibald [19] give more details on various malicious and legitimate covert timing channel applications.
At present, the research on the network covert channel for real-time interaction mainly focuses on constructing covert channels for Internet-based Voice over IP (VoIP) voice and video traffics. With the rapid development and popularity of Long Term Evolution (LTE) networks, Voice over LTE (VoLTE) provides a smooth transition path from hybrid network voice services to ubiquitous all-LTE network voice. Although the emergence of Internet-based voice services such as Skype, WeChat, and Google Talk poses new challenges to the cost and portability of VoLTE, VoLTE outperforms these VoIP applications in terms of user experience and quality of service. For example, IP traffic overload in networks and devices will affect VoIP service quality, which is not the case in VoLTE, and VoLTE provides better interoperability. In addition, the mobile network is about to enter the 5G era, and VoLTE fits well with 5G, making it the foundation for carrier-grade voice and video calling services in future 5G networks. Mobile communication brings many benefits, but also brings threats such as information leakage, and covert channels can be an effective means to transmit confidential information in mobile networks. Therefore, it is necessary to study the construction method of VoLTE covert channels.
In order to build an effective covert channel, many research solutions have been proposed [20] - [22] . However, the existing covert channel construction scheme based on inter-packet delay (IPD) cannot be directly applied to VoLTE because the IPDs of VoLTE traffic is limited to a small range and has strong regularity, which makes the modulation of IPDs easy to detect, and it is difficult to hide covert message into the IPDs of VoLTE traffic. Therefore, based on the research of VoLTE traffic characteristics, we propose a VoLTE twoway covert channel, which includes a sender-to-receiver covert timing channel that modulates covert message through actively dropping packets during the silence periods and a reverse covert storage channel that hides the acceptance of the covert message as feedback information into the feedback control information field of the RTCP packet. In order to verify the effectiveness of the covert channel created, we conducted experiments and analysis in the real VoLTE environment, and gave the test results. In this paper, the research on the construction method of VoLTE covert channel will provide useful reference for construction and detection technology of covert channels over mobile networks.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows: In section II, we review related work on existing covert channels. We present the preliminaries including VoLTE traffic analysis and Gray code in section III. Then, in section IV, we give an overview of the proposed two-way VoLTE covert channel. We show how to construct a two-way covert channel that meets performance requirements in section V and discuss the performance evaluation including undetectability and robustness in section VI. We provide the experimental results and analyses in section VII. Finally, we conclude with discussion and future research directions in section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
Covert storage channels usually hide the covert message encoding into the protocol field. Covert storage channels generally use the following construction methods: (1) The covert channel encodes the covert message using the size of the header element or the protocol data unit (PDU) [7] . (2) The covert channel changes the sequence of the header or PDU elements to encode the covert message [8] . (3) The covert channel creates a new space within a given header element or within a hidden data PDU, or the encapsulated IP packet size is smaller than the size specified in the Ethernet frame size to use the IP packet tail space for covert message [9] , etc. (4) The covert channel encodes the covert message as a reserved header or PDU element [23] . (5) The covert channel hides the covert message by modifying the data in the packet [10] .
The construction methods of covert timing channels are mainly based on IPD and packet reordering. The IPD-based covert timing channels are implemented by modulating the inter-packet delay of the data packets of the overt traffic. On the other hand, the covert timing channel based on packet reordering are built by encoding covert message into a sequence of data packets in a single stream or multiple streams.
In 1987, Girling [24] first published a study on the covert timing channel on the LAN. The author analyzed the capacity of the covert timing channel, but this early study did not consider the different requirements of the covert timing channel's undetectability and robustness. Luo et al. [20] proposed a TCP-based covert timing channel called TCPScript, which embeds covert message into the number of packets in the TCP burst. In order to ensure undetectability, the normal burst mode of TCP is maintained. Although the authors have given the results of capacity and robustness to packet loss and out-of-order, there is no solution to improve performance. Sellke et al. [25] proposed another IPD-based covert timing channel based on TCP/IP. There are two versions of this covert timing channel, one has low capacity but undetectability, while the other version is not resistant to detection but has high capacity. Kiyavash and Coleman [26] have proposed an IPD-based covert timing channel for interactive SSH (Secure Shell) traffic. This study only met the undetectability requirements guaranteed by statistical tests considering overt traffic. A time-replay covert timing channel (TR-CTC) is proposed in Cabuk [11] to transmit covert message by replaying a sequence of previously recorded time intervals. Although the requirements for undetectability are considered, the study does not address robustness and high capacity requirements.
In order to improve the robustness of covert timing channels, many studies have adopted different types of coding schemes. Liu et al. [27] proposed a spread code for IPD-based covert timing channel. The use of spreading code results in a covert timing channel that is more robust but has a lower capacity. In addition, this method is only applicable to independent and identically distributed IPDs. Different error correction codes are given in CoCo [12] for improving the robustness. In addition to robustness, other requirements such as undetectability and high capacity were also considered in the study. The Huffman code compression covert timing channel is [21] proposed by Wu et al. Although they gave experimental results for undetectability and capacity, robustness was not considered in the study.
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Gianvecchio et al. [28] proposed a model-based covert timing channel (MB-CTC) that mimics the overt traffic statistics feature. Although they considered undetectability and capacity requirements, they did not consider robustness requirements. Liu et al. [29] proposed a covert timing channel with distribution matching. The author considered all the requirements of an effective covert timing channel. Ahmadzadeh and Agnew [22] proposed a polynomial time undetectable and high capacity MB-CTC. They use a grid structure in the modulation phase of the sender and the iterative demodulation phase of the receiver. In order to improve the robustness of the channel without loss of undetectability, they also use an adaptive modulation scheme. Archibald [19] proposed the MB-CTC with fountain code. MB-CTCs are typically applied to independent and identically distributed IPDs. The results show that if the real IPDs are not independently and identically distributed, then the covert channel can be detected. Zander et al. [30] proposed an undetectable covert timing channel that uses a portion of each IPD to embed covert message, which results in a covert timing channel that is highly sensitive to channel noise and therefore lacks robustness.
Ahsan and Kundur [31] have proposed a covert timing channel for packet ordering within the IPSec framework. The different requirements for effective covert timing channels were not considered in this earlier paper. El-Atawy and Al-Shaer [32] propose another covert channel based on packet rearrangement, using a specific permutation of consecutive packets to improve robustness. In addition, the covert channel simulates real traffic distribution to improve undetectability, and it also considers the high-capacity requirements. Chakinala et al. [33] gave another similar work. In order to achieve maximum channel capacity, they proposed a polynomial time-optimal encoding and decoding algorithm. In this theoretical study, it is proposed how to improve the actual covert timing channel capacity, but does not consider solutions to improve other different performance requirements.
Some special methods have also appeared in the recent research work of the covert timing channel construction.
[34]- [36] . Although there are not many relevant research literatures, these methods are useful explorations for the research of covert timing channel construction methods, and also provide a reference for the research of VoLTE covert channel construction methods.
III. PRELIMINARIES A. VoLTE
With the in-depth deployment of LTE networks and the popularity of smartphones, data services are beginning to emerge. LTE has successfully penetrated into the cellular communication market and has become the mainstream of communication technology. As an all-IP technology, LTE has many advantages, including robustness, low latency, and high bandwidth. However, since all-IP networks are inherently incompatible with voice processing and cannot utilize traditional circuit-switched-based voice services, there are many challenges in providing voice services based on an all-IP architecture. To meet the diverse and personalized needs of users, operators need VoLTE to provide innovative and rich data services such as HD voice and video calling. LTE networks provide higher data capacity and lower latency for mobile broadband. To compensate for the shortcomings of circuit-switched voice, VoLTE is widely used in the mobile industry as an IP-based LTE voice and video calling solution. It is a global interoperability solution that provides the advanced and innovative communication service.
While some prior art also provides voice services over LTE, VoLTE has seen significant growth due to its higher spectral efficiency and compatibility with rich multimedia voice experiences. OTT (Over The Top) refers to the provision of voice services through third parties such as Skype or Google Talk, which is relatively inexpensive and become very popular. However, there is no guarantee of QoS and service continuity using this method, especially when user equipment moves outside of the LTE coverage area, where dropped calls and call failures occur frequently, while VoLTE provides better voice and video quality through dedicated bearers and bandwidth. Since the queued tasks in the pipeline compete for bandwidth, but the OTT application is at a higher level and cannot control the lower layers of the device software stack, latency is a major problem in OTT applications. In contrast, VoLTE has better control over transmit and receive processing because VoLTE can be integrated with low-level drivers and network interfaces. With support for smartphones and networks, VoLTE has been able to provide users with a seamless, high-quality experience.
B. VoLTE TRAFFIC ANALYSIS
In order to analyze the characteristics of VoLTE traffic, we developed packet capture software for mobile devices to capture packets in the VoLTE video calling. Two Samsung A5108 mobile phones that support VoLTE calling are selected, where Android system version is 5.1.1 and the kernel version is 3.10.61. The network environment is China Mobile 4G network. Figure 1 shows the IPDs of VoLTE voice traffic. Comparing (a) and (b), we can see the difference between the IPDs of the sender and the receiver. For voice traffic, as shown in Figure 1 , the IPDs of the voice packets sent by the sender are basically 20ms. The IPDs of the voice packet at the receiver vary greatly from the IPDs at the sender, and the regularity is not obvious. Jitter is the amount of network delay variation. It is generated by any two adjacent packets of the same application during network transmission. Jitter is very important for real-time applications, and any type of streaming media is susceptible to jitter. Excessive jitter is usually a symptom of a network congestion or insufficient bandwidth to handle traffic. Figure 2 shows the jitter of VoLTE voice traffic. The voice traffic Jitter varies greatly (−36.3 ∼ 69.9)ms, and the average value is -0.08ms. There is no regular change in the voice traffic jitter. By analyzing the IPD and jitter of VoLTE traffic, it can be seen that the IPDs of VoLTE traffic are limited to a small range and have obvious regularity, and both video traffic and voice traffic have a large jitter variation. According to the characteristics analysis of VoLTE traffic, since the IPDs of VoLTE traffic are obviously regular when the sender sends, if the traditional IPD-based covert timing channel construction method is used, the modulation and modification of the IPDs of the VoLTE traffic will be easily detected by the opponent. At the same time, due to the large variation of the jitter of VoLTE traffic, the IPD-based covert timing channel construction scheme will also face challenges in decoding and accurate secret information cannot be obtained, which will result in high bit error rate. These features make the IPD-based hidden channel construction method not suitable for VoLTE traffic. Therefore, this paper proposes a two-way covert channel construction method for VoLTE traffic, which can ensure the constructed covert channel undetectable and robust.
VoLTE voice services exist in two states: talk spurts and silence period. In talk spurts, the sending interval of the voice packet is 20ms and the voice packet size depends on the currently used coding rate. In silence period, the sending interval of SID (Silence Insertion Descriptor) frame is usually 160ms.
The difference between talk spurts and silence period is that the size of voice packet is larger than that of SID frame, and there is a significant difference between the time intervals of the adjacent voice packets and the time intervals of the adjacent SID frames. We build a covert timing channel from the sender to the receiver by actively dropping packets during the silence periods, and the covert message is modulated into the numbers of SID packets in the silence periods since a moderate change in the silent period is not easily detected.
C. GRAY CODE
In order to improve the robustness of the covert channel, the Gray Code (GC) is used to encode the covert message. After the covert message is encoded, packet loss and packet out of order in the network transmission will only cause one bit error, that is, all consecutive code words are exactly different in one bit position, so this feature of Gray code can greatly reduce the bit error rate.
A Gray code of length k is a sequence of k-bit sequences, the nature of which is that each codeword differs from the next codeword only in one bit position. Since the first and last codewords are also different in the position of one bit, the Gray code is a cyclic code. The most famous of these codes is the binary reflection Gray code GC(k), which can be inductively defined as [37] : GC(1) contains the codewords 0 and 1, and GC(k + 1) first lists GC(k), and adds 0 to each codeword, then lists GC(k) in reverse order, and adds 1 before each codeword. For example, GC(2) = (00, 01, 11, 10), then GC(3) = (000, 001, 011, 010, 110, 111, 101, 100). Gray code was first designed to accelerate telegraphs, but is now commonly used in digital communications to detect and correct channel noise. Gray code belongs to reliability coding and is an error-mining coding method.
In the covert channel construction scheme, the Gray code is used to encode the covert channel to reduce the influence of channel noise, and a variable code length coding scheme is designed to fit the SID packet distribution in the silence period of the overt traffic. The Gray code characterized by only one bit difference of two consecutive values is robust to packet out-of-order. The variable code length scheme means that the length of the secret information bits encoded by the Gray code is determined by the number of SID packets in the current silent period, so that each SID packet number carries a variable information bit length. Figure 3 gives the mapping position of the variable length Gray code coding scheme and the Gray Region (GR). The size of each Gray region s gr is determined according to the variable code length sequence (s gr = 2 l j ), such as the variable code length sequence in the figure 3 is {1, 2, 3, 4, . . . }, then the size of the Gray region is {2, 4, 8, 16, . . . }, the code length is different from l j , the size of the gray region is different, and the length of the Gray code corresponding to the position of the gray region. The corresponding Gray code can be determined according to the number of the SID packets in the silence period mapped to the position of the Gray region.
The efficiency of the variable code length scheme is difficult to determine since it is related to the selected variable code length sequence, that is, the number of SID packets used to hide the secret information. Generally, the larger the average code length ofl, the higher the transmission efficiency of secret information bits. The Gray code results in low bit error rate and good robustness. In fact, when using the variable length code length scheme, the smaller the average code lengthl, the higher the bit error rate. Accordingly, when the sender selects a variable code length scheme, different code length sequences will produce different error rates.
IV. THE TWO-WAY VoLTE COVERT CHANNEL
The two-way VoLTE covert channel is composed of a covert timing channel from the sender to the receiver and a reverse covert storage channel. On one hand, the covert timing channel from the sender to the receiver is implemented by actively dropping packets during the silence periods, and the covert message is modulated into the numbers of SID packets in the silence periods. The silence period is a normal phenomenon in a voice call, and a moderate change in the silent period is not easily detected. At the same time, the use of Gray coding ensures the robustness of the covert channel against the adversary's intentional packet loss attack. The changes of silent periods may affect the covert channel undetectability and reduce the voice quality of the conversation, so the variable length coding is employed to meet the undetectability and voice quality requirements. On the other hand, a covert storage channel is built for feedback from the receiver to the sender, and it hides the acceptance of the covert message as feedback information into the feedback control information field of the RTCP packet back to the sender. These certain bits of the fields are selected to serve as acknowledgment bits for the covert message transmission. The sender evaluates the current attack severity according to the feedback and adjusts the real-time parameters of the covert timing channel to weigh the relationship between the robustness of the adversary's active attack and other performance of the covert timing channel. After many rounds of feedback, the security confrontation against the active attack of the adversary is finally realized. The two-way feedback covert channel is shown in Figure 4 .
V. COVERT CHANNEL CONSTRUCTION A. ENCODING
We use Gray code to mitigate channel noise since Gray code is characterized by two consecutive values that differ only in one bit resulting in robustness to packet reordering and packet loss. The covert message is encoded by the Gray code according to the variable length l determined by the number of SID packets in the silence period. The covert information bits are encoded into code symbols with a variable length of l, where each silent period carries one piece of information bits of length l. The larger the average bit length of the symbol, the higher the transmission efficiency of the covert message. Therefore, if you want to increase the capacity of the covert channel, you can select the voice traffic with a longer average silence period as the carrier.
B. MODULATION
In our covert timing channel, the encoded covert information is modulated into the numbers of SID packets in the silence period. We consider a one-to-one mapping as the conversion of a symbol s i to the numbers of SID packets n i must be invertible: n i := G(s i ) where G(·) is an invertible function. Correspondingly, n i := G −1 (s i ) represents that the demodulation is done at the receiver, where n i is the received numbers of SID packets, and s i denotes the symbols which the numbers of SID packets demodulated into. The first SID packet is used as a synchronization identifier to mark the beginning of the covert timing channel. At the end of the silence period, the sender calculates the number of SID packets in the silence period to determine how many covert information bits can be transmitted. According to the number of SID packets n i , the maximum l can be found that satisfies GraytoDec(Getmessage(l)) ≤ n i − 2 < GraytoDec(Getmessage(l +1)), where (1 ≤ l ≤ 8). However, it is also determined according to the RTCP feedback value whether to use the calculated maximum l or the value after the degradation. If the number of SID packets n i is not equal to the symbol value, the sender will actively discard the extra SID packets to make the two values equal. Moreover, the sender will modify the tail SID packet so that the time interval between the tail packet and the previous SID packet is l * 20. In this way, the size of l can be judged by the tail packet interval. The modulation process is also demonstrated in Algorithm 1. grayvalue ← GraytoDec(GetMessage(l)) 7: if num = grayvalue then 8: Dropout(num − grayvalue)
Algorithm 1 Covert Message Encoding and
ModifyTailSID(l * 20)
10:
end if 11: end if 12: Get the start of the next Silence Period 13: end while
C. RTCP FEEDBACK
A covert storage channel is built for feedback from the receiver to the sender, and it hides the acceptance of the covert message as feedback information into the feedback control information field of the RTCP packet back to the sender.
We use the 16 bits of the bitmask of the lost packet in the feedback control information field to feed back the receiver's confirmation of the covert message. Among them, 8 bits are used to indicate the number of received covert information bits, and the other 8 bits are used to store the last eight bits of the received covert message. Moreover, in order to ensure undetectability of the covert storage channel, not all RTCP packets are used to feedback the reception of covert message, and the interval frequency of the selected RTCP is determined according to the capacity of the sender-to-receiver covert timing channel.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Firstly, the undetectability of the covert channel is analyzed according to the proposed scheme. If for any k ∈ N exists a polynomial p(z) over N such that 
If a covert timing channel is available for any distinguisher D with a runtime polynomial in δ, and such that Adv D (D N , D N ) is negligible in δ for any N with a polynomial in δ, then the covert timing channel is undetectable for the security parameter δ. [27] The Probability Mass Function (PMF) of the code symbol s i is given by the formula 2
where 0 ≤ g ≤ 2¯l − 1 and g ∈ Z,l is the average code length of the variable length coding scheme.
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After encoding, the value of the code symbol s i is a discrete random variable of the cumulative density function represented by F s (·). As can be seen from the formula 3, F s (·) can be calculated by accumulating the PMF of the code symbol.
where g m is the unique value in the ascending order of the code symbols. After the modulation, the cumulative distribution function F n (·) of the number of SID packet in covert traffic n i can be obtained, and Fñ(·) is the cumulative distribution function of the number of SID packet in overt trafficñ i . The difference between F n (·) and Fñ(·) can identify the undetectability. This difference depends on the amount of change in the number of SID packet during the modulation process, Next, the robustness of the covert channel is discussed. P e represents the bit error rate (BER) of direct modulation without encoding and P e denotes the BER after encoding and modulation with a specific coding scheme in the same network condition. If γ =P e /P e , where γ ∈ R + (γ is called robustness gain), then the covert timing channel is called γ gain robust [27] . When γ → ∞, the covert timing channel can be considered completely robust. The robustness gain γ is given by the formula 4
where N denotes the number of silence periods, R l denotes packet lose rate, and e j Indicates the number of error covert information bits caused by the j-th packet loss. Since the scheme employs Gray code to encode the covert message, the bit error rate will be closely related to the Gray code coding scheme. Obviously, the larger thel, the larger the γ , and the better the covert channel robustness. The bit error rate of the covert channel can reach P e ≤ for a given robustness requirement of ∈ R + . When a is given, the undetectability requirements of the covert channel should be weighed together, and the appropriatel should be selected to construct a valid VoLTE covert channel.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
To analyze the performance of the proposed covert channel, we used VoLTE traffic between two mobile phones. As long as the devices and systems support VoLTE, our solution can be successfully implemented on different mobile devices and different versions of android. We chose two Samsung A5108 phones, of which the Android version is 5.1.1 and the kernel version is 3.10.61. We test our solution by the two phones as sender and receiver. We capture the VoLTE voice traffic of the sender and receiver in the experiment. Due to that the existing software cannot capture the VoLTE voice packets processed by the baseband program, we have developed a capture program based on the Android kernel. According to our solution, covert traffics are generated by encoding and modulating overt traffics.
A. UNDETECTABILITY
We use KS test, a standard statistical test, to visualize and verify undetectability. In Figure 5 , the KS p-values are all greater than 0.05 for the number of SID packets in the silence period of the five overt traffic, which indicates that the number of SID packets of these traffics fit the same distribution. On the other hand, Figure 5 also shows that KS p-values are all greater than 0.05 for the number of SID packets of the five corresponding covert traffics which represents that the covert traffics fit the same distribution with the overt traffic. Figure 6 shows the KLD test results for the number of SID packets in the silent period of the overt and covert traffics. As can be seen from Figure 6 , the KLD values of the overt traffics are in the range of (0.047 ∼ 0.312), and the KLD values of the covert traffics are in the range of (0.003 ∼ 0.013). Obviously, the KLD values of the numbers of SID packets in the silent period of all covert traffics are lower than ones of the public traffic, and the KLD values of almost all covert traffics are less than 0.01, indicating that the distributions of the SID packets of these covert traffics are very close to the distributions of the original overt traffics.
B. ROBUSTNESS
We measure the robustness of covert channels with BER of the decoded covert message. In figure 7 , the BER of the proposed covert channel reaches 10 −3 when R l is less than 0.2%, whereas the BER increases to 10 −1 when R l is greater than 5%. The sort of performance for all covert traffics are similar in different network conditions. In summary, the proposed covert channel remains valid even under high network jitter. Specifically, the covert channel with larger average number of SID packets can achieve better robustness.
At the same time, the receiver-to-sender covert storage channel feedbacks the transmission of the covert message through RTCP packets. If the feedback information indicates that the current bit error rate is high, the sender will adjust the covert timing channel modulation parameters or even suspend the delivery of the covert message to resist the active attack of the adversary.
Moreover, we also compare the robustness of the constructed hybrid covert channel (HCC) with the five covert channels mentioned above. These covert channels include the spreading code timing channel (STC) [27] , the code-based covert timing channel (CoCo) [12] , fountain code timing channel (FTC) [38] , analog fountain code timing channel (AFTC) [39] and packet reordering time Channel (PRTC) [32] . As shown in figure 8 , the BER of the FTC is about 10 −1 , and the BER of the covert channel based on the SID packet dropout proposed in this paper reaches 10 −2 . The BERs of the other four covert channels also reach 10 −2 . In the case of normal communication, the robustness of the constructed VoLTE covert channel is better, because this scheme only modulates the SID packets, and Gray code provides a guarantee for improving the robustness of the covert channel according to the proposed construction scheme.
C. VOICE QUALITY
Ensuring voice quality is important to mask the existence of covert channels, especially for VoLTE calling that handles high-definition voice communications. In addition, a number of methods provided in the literature on multimedia analysis of detection require that the covert channel should fully maintain the overall quality of the call. Therefore, in order to evaluate the impact of embedding covert message in a VoLTE session, we performed a Mean Opinion Score (MOS) and discussed the appropriate length of secret information bit embedding.
In this section, the overt voice extracted from the original overt traffic is compared with the covert voice extracted from the covert traffic embedded with covert message, and then the call voice quality is evaluated. Voice quality is assessed using MOS voice testing, which considers speech items that are extracted from five overt traffics and corresponding covert traffics. Figure 9 gives the MOS value and the maximum and minimum range of the speech quality of the overt voice and the covert voice. As can be seen from the figure 9, the overt voice has a higher MOS value as expected. The comparison between the overt voice and covert voice MOS value shows that the covert voice MOS value is very close to the overt voice MOS value, which indicates that the voice quality of the covert voice is very good. The voice quality of the covert traffic is good since the constructed covert channel has no influence on the packets containing the voice information, and only the length of the silent period has a certain change. Obviously, as the average number of SID packets in the silent periods increases, the average code length ofl increases, and the voice quality gradually deteriorates. Therefore, if the undetectability of the covert channel is to be maintained, a smallerl must be chosen to ensure that the adversary cannot detect the existence of a covert channel by voice quality.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The existing covert channel solution based on IPDs cannot be applied to VoLTE due to the limited and regular IPDs. Therefore, we proposed a VoLTE covert timing channel that modulates covert message through actively dropping SID packets during the silence periods and a reverse covert storage channel that embeds the acceptance of the covert message as feedback information into RTCP packets. To improve the robustness, we use Gray code to encode the covert message for mitigating the effects of packet loss. To remain undetectability, we employ controllable active packet dropout to fit the packet distribution of covert traffic to the distribution of the overt traffic. We discuss the performance of the proposed covert channel including undetectability and robustness. Experiment results show the potential of the proposed approach adaptive to mobile network environment. Moreover, there are still many future works worth completing, for example, the capacity can still be further improved by applying other encoding and modulation methods, and the feedback channel can adapt more efficiently to real-time mobile network environments.
